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“Liberty Can Find No Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt”2
INTRODUCTION 
In Lawrence v. Texas3, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion4, which invalidated a 
state statute prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults, and Justice Scalia’s dissent5,
which attacked the very foundation upon which the majority’s reasoning was predicated, 
underscored the widely divergent methods of constitutional interpretation that both 
Justices embrace in “values based” adjudication.6
Indeed, as set forth infra, in holding that the United State’s Constitution’s 
“liberty” interest7 protected the right of two consenting adults to engage in sodomy, 
Justice Breyer’s reasoning arguably reflected a “progressive”, “dynamic”, or “evolving” 
 
1 Master of Laws Candidate, NYU School of Law.  B.A., University of Southern California (1997); J.D., 
With Honors, Ohio  State University College of Law (2001).   
 
2 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).  
 
3 Lawrence, et al. v. Texas, No. 02-102 (June 26, 2003) (Slip Op), official cite 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (formal 
citation forthcoming) .  
 
4 See id. at (Slip op. at 1). 
 
5 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
6 For purposes of clarity, the term “values based” adjudication refers to those cases in which the asserted 
constitutional “right” conflicts with or implicates matters that State legislatures have either circumscribed 
or prohibited based upon, inter alia, notions of conventional morality. By “conventional morality”, the 
author implies that at least a portion of the reasoning underlying a legislature’s policy predilections relates 
to notions of what is “right” or “wrong” in a religious or ethical context.  In other words, these divisive 
cases often involve considerations regarding the moral basis of individual and/or collective conduct. Other 
cases, for example, that fall within the purview of this delineation are Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Casey, supra note 2. 
 
7 The “liberty” interest referred to in this Article arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
2approach to constitutional interpretation, which views the Constitution as a “living” 
document whose meaning is based, at least in part, upon an “emerging awareness8” of
contemporary customs, norms and perspectives.9 Indeed, Justice Breyer’s dynamic 
approach to “values based” constitutional decision-making is perhaps best underscored 
by the fact that, in striving to divine an “emerging awareness”10 to inform his view of the 
Constitution’s “liberty” interest11, Justice Breyer resorted to, an relied upon, foreign 
sources of law, i.e., decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights12, to 
support the Lawrence majority’s holding.13 
Conversely, Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Lawrence reflects his traditional 
adherence to an “originalist”14 philosophy of constitutional decision-making which, 
broadly construed, advances the proposition that fundamental constitutional rights exist 
 
8 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 11 (majority opinion of Breyer, J). 
 
9 Of course, the notion of an “evolving”, “progressive” or “dynamic” method of constitutional 
interpretation is an approach endorsed and expressed in various forms by scholars, judges and litigants. 
This Article is narrowly confined to examining Justice Breyer’s “progressive” approach in the Lawrence 
decision, and to analyzing the implications of such methodology in “values based” cases that are likely to 
arise before the United States Supreme Court.  
 
10 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 11 (majority opinion of Breyer, J). 
 
11 See supra note 7.  
 
12 See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 12 (majority opinion of Breyer, J). 
 
13 The utilization of foreign sources of law, to inform or otherwise support domestic constitutional 
decisions, is reflected in the relative recent theory of “comparative constitutionalism”, which examines, 
inter alia, the prudence of relying upon or referring to such sources in the domestic constitutional context  
This Article is confined to both discussing Justice Breyer’s use of foreign law, particularly decisional law 
from the European Court of Human Rights, in crafting the Lawrence opinion, and whether the use of 
foreign law is workable and pragmatic in the context of domestic, “values based” decision-making. For a 
more complete discussion of “comparative constitutionalism”, see, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, “The 
Permeability of Constitutional Borders”, 82 Texas L. Rev. 1763 (2004). 
 
14 The “originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation exists in many forms and is applicable to many 
contexts. The purpose of this Article is to examine Justice Scalia’s use of “originalism” in the Lawrence 
decision, and to assess the workability of this approach in future cases likely to arise before the United 
States Supreme Court. 
 
3only to the extent that such rights are “deeply rooted” in the United State’s culture, 
history and tradition.15 Thus, in the context of “values based” adjudication, Justice 
Scalia’s framework is to inquire whether and, if so, to what extent, the asserted 
fundamental right has traditionally engendered support, protection or recognition in the 
United State’s historical cultural practice.16 Such inquiry arguably involves an 
examination of both the founders’ intent when drafting a particular constitutional 
provision, as well as the early understandings of particular rights that were deemed 
fundamental or worthy of heightened constitutional protection.  Under this view, in 
“values based” adjudication, the notion of an “emerging” or “evolving” awareness of 
fundamental rights, whether from foreign or domestic sources, would be largely 
irrelevant to the question of whether an asserted right warrants constitutional protection.17 
This Article endeavors to bridge the divide between Justice Breyer’s “progressive 
approach”, and the “originalist” approach to which Justice Scalia adheres, by introducing 
the concept of “reverse” or “negative” originalism. As a threshold matter, “reverse 
originalism” recognizes that both Justice Breyer’s progressivism and Justice Scalia’s 
originalism contain valuable aspects that should remain relevant to “values based” 
constitutional adjudication. For  example, “reverse originalism” proposes, in accordance 
 
15 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
721 (1997)).  
 
16 Id. at 8-9 (citing Reno v. Flores (507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)) (“fundamental liberty interests must be ‘so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’”). (omitting internal 
quotation marks and citations). 
 
17 Importantly, for purposes of this Article, the notion that Justice Scalia would largely eschew reliance 
upon an “emerging” or “evolving” awareness of newly-asserted rights is limited to the context of “values 
based” adjudication. Indeed, in the area of Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 
jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court, including Justice Scalia, has endorsed a method that 
examines whether “evolving standards of decency” counsel in favor of determining that a specific practice 
is cruel or unusual.  
 
4with Justice Breyer’s approach, that “evolving” or contemporary perspectives of fairness 
and due process should inform the search for a disposition, in “values based” 
adjudication, that is most consonant with basic notions of liberty.  Indeed, the collective 
conscience of individuals, groups and institutions, over time, both domestic and 
international, can provide important insights into the very meaning of “liberty” that lies at 
the core of the United States’ constitutional framework.  
Importantly, however, progressivism is not without its limitations and, if applied 
exclusively, would threaten to undermine years of Supreme Court jurisprudence  through 
evisceration of the stare decisis doctrine18, risk uncertainty and unpredictability for future 
litigants, unduly compromise the core majoritarian premise of our democratic system, 
and potentially invest in judges a legislative or policy-making power that transgresses the 
boundaries of proper judicial review. Consequently, a significant check upon the 
limitations of “progressivism” lies in that aspect of “originalism” which reflects the 
principle that the United States’ historical traditions, customs and practices should 
maintain an important role in determining the values that we believe are worthy of 
domestic constitutional protection. As such, the Constitution’s text,  the very meaning of 
“liberty” that emanates from its provisions, and our country’s deeply-rooted cultural 
understandings regarding the concept of “liberty”, must continue to inform current 
perspectives concerning those “values” that the United States will deem fundamental.   
As with “progressivism”, however, the application of “originalism” is not without 
its limitations. Most significantly, the exclusive application of “originalism” is likely to 
 
18 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 3, at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the doctrine of stare decicis 
supports the overruling of prior Supreme Court decisions only where: (1) its foundations have been 
“eroded”; (2) it has been subject to “substantial and continuing criticism”, and (3) it has not induced 
“individual or societal reliance” that militates against overruling it). 
 
5result in constitutional decisions that contemporary perspectives  would arguably deem 
unfair and unjust.19 Indeed, such criticism is not without merit because, while  
conceptions of “liberty” involve reference to deeply-rooted historical practice and 
custom, such conceptions do not remain inert or immutable, but are instead receptive to 
the evolution in human thought that Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” embraces. Herein 
lies the problem, namely, what method can best recognize the “emerging awareness” that 
Justice Breyer relies upon in Lawrence, yet remain faithful to the text, history and 
historical traditions that  “originalism” strives to maintain.  
This Article proposes that “negative originalism” can bridge this divide and 
effectuate the objectives of Justice Breyer’s progressivism, i.e., just results based upon 
evolving standards of fairness, and Justice Scalia’s “originalism”, by re-framing the 
relevant constitutional inquiry in “values based” adjudication. Specifically, instead of 
asking precisely what the framers intended when drafting a particular constitutional 
provision, the relevant inquiry should assess whether the recognition of a new 
fundamental right in our constitutional regime would offend, affront, or otherwise be 
incongruous with the broad purposes underlying both the Constitution’s provisions and 
the United State’s rich historical tradition. As detailed infra, this approach will allow the 
Supreme Court to consider contemporary perspectives regarding fundamental fairness, 
liberty and equality, both at the national and international level, when deciding whether 
newly asserted rights or “values” warrant constitutional protection.  
However, “negative originalism” will also require the Court to lend significant 
weight to the intentions, purposes and objectives that informed both the Constitution’s 
 
19 See generally Cass Sunstein, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005) (arguing that originalism would lead to unjust results in many cases). 
 
6drafting and the nation’s early understandings of liberty.  However, instead of advocating 
that the Court endeavor to divine the precise meaning that the Constitution’s drafters, or 
early legislatures, specifically intended for a given constitutional provision, “negative 
originalism” proposes that the Court develop an understanding of the broader conception 
of liberty, fairness and equality that inspired the Constitution’s substantive provisions. In 
this way, “negative originalism” ensures that our country’s rich history and tradition 
remains relevant in “values based” cases, but also recognizes that contemporary 
perspectives concerning fairness and equality, both domestic and foreign, can be useful 
in fashioning solutions to problems that the Constitution’s drafters could never have 
envisaged.    
Part II briefly discusses the Lawrence decision, specifically with reference to the 
differing approaches that Justices Breyer and Scalia utilized in reaching their respective 
conclusions. Part III examines a critical component of Justice Breyer’s progressivism, 
namely, that aspect which relied upon foreign law, namely the European Court of Human 
Rights, to support the Lawrence holding. Part III concludes that, while resort to foreign 
sources of law should bear relevance in “values based” adjudication, courts should 
exercise substantial caution when relying upon foreign sources of law, due to the cultural 
and institutional nuances that underlie such laws.  Part IV introduces “negative 
originalism”, and argues that this method of constitutional interpretation will most 
effectively permit the Court to adopt a dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation, 
i.e., consideration of evolving perspectives of fairness, while also ensuring fidelity to the 
Constitution’s text and history.   
 
7PART II 
 
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: HIGHLIGHTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN JUSTICE BREYER’S
“PROGRESSIVISM” AND JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM”
In Lawrence, the Court was confronted with the question of whether a state 
statute, criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults, impermissibly violated the 
privacy, equal protection, and “liberty” interests under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.20 Significantly, this issue was 
not without precedent, as the Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick21 previously ruled that a 
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults did not violate these 
fundamental guarantees.22 
Thus, Lawrence presented the Court with an opportunity both to revisit the 
Bowers holding and examine the reasoning upon which it was predicated. In so doing, the 
Court, per Justice Kennedy, overruled Bowers, and proceeded to recognize consensual 
sodomy as a protected right pursuant to the Constitution’s “liberty” interest.23 As stated 
above, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion not only signaled a sharp departure from 
Bowers, particularly through its expansive view of the Constitution’s “liberty” interest, 
 
20 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 3 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
21 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 
22 See id. Arguably, the facts in Bowers differ from Lawrence to the extent that the Georgia statute in 
Bowers criminalized consensual sodomy regardless of whether the participants were of the same sex, 
whereas the Texas statute in Lawrence was directed exclusively at same-sex participants. Notwithstanding, 
the reasoning upon which Bowers rested, and Lawrence subsequently rejected, involve a view of the 
Constitution’s “liberty” interest that is largely unaffected by this distinction.    
 
23 See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 17-18 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). It can be argued, however, that the 
Court did not hold that consensual sodomy was a fundamental right per se, but rather that matters of sexual 
intimacy, on a broader level, enjoy fundamental rights protection, under which consensual sodomy 
derivatively enjoys protection. 
 
8but also underscored the “progressivism” that increasingly defines his jurisprudence in 
“values based” adjudication.  
A. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S PROGRESSIVISM IN LAWRENCE 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that Justice Breyer’s majority decision 
was not premised solely upon a “progressive” or “evolving” view of the Constitution’s 
“liberty” interest. For example, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice Scalia’s view that 
homosexual sodomy has, as a matter of historical tradition and practice, been widely 
circumscribed.24 In addition, Justice Breyer relied upon what he termed “broad 
statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause” as reflected 
in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence.25 
Notwithstanding, Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” played a crucial role both in 
his conclusion that Bowers’ foundation had been eroded by subsequent jurisprudence, 
and that homosexual sodomy now fell within the purview of the Constitution’s “liberty” 
interest. 26 First, Justice Breyer’s analysis focused not only upon the historical roots and 
practices pertaining to consensual sodomy (although he did dispute the extent to which 
 
24 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 7 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (stating that “there is no long-standing history 
in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”). In fact, Justice Breyer went so 
far as to state that “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex that the majority opinion 
… indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated”). Id. at 10.  
 
25 Id. at 3 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (Justice Breyer relied, for example, upon dicta from Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska (262 U.S. 390); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird (405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for his 
view certain conduct enjoys “real and substantial protection as an exercise of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause”).  Id. at 4. 
 
26 A critical aspect of Justice Breyer’s view that Bowers foundation was eroded by subsequent 
jurisprudence is reflected by his statement that Bowers failed to “appreciate the extent of the liberty at 
stake” and “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented …” Lawrence, supra note 3, at 6 (Breyer, 
J., majority opinion). In fact, Justice Breyer’s classification of the “liberty” interest in Lawrence arguably  
reflected the broader sentiment, as expressed in previous decisions, that conceptions of “private human 
conduct” and “sexual behavior”, warrant protection under the Constitution’s “liberty” interest.  See, e.g., 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.  The right to engage in consensual sodomy, therefore, falls within these broader 
liberty interests. 
 
9laws were targeted at such conduct27), but instead stated that “we think that our laws and 
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”28 Indeed, Justice Breyer 
utilized this framework in Lawrence to highlight a “progressive” or “evolving” method of 
constitutional interpretation: 
These references [recent precedent] show an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex. “[H]istory and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due 
process inquiry.” This emerging recognition should have been apparent when 
Bowers was decided.29 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s search for an “emerging awareness” led him to focus not 
upon historical culture, practice or tradition, but instead upon more recent domestic 
developments, i.e., the Model Penal Code’s recommendation that private sexual conduct 
not be penalized, and several states’ failure to enforce anti-sodomy laws, for the 
proposition that homosexual conduct was includable within the Constitution’s liberty 
interest.30 
Of far more import, however, was the fact that, as part of his “emerging 
awareness” analysis, Justice Breyer relied upon foreign sources of law to support the 
Lawrence holding. For example, Justice Breyer relied upon the British Parliament’s 1957 
recommendation that homosexual conduct not be punished.31 More importantly, however, 
and in what is a focal point of this Article, Justice Breyer relied substantially upon 
 
27 See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 7 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
28 Id. at 11 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).  
 
29 Id. at 11 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 
30 Id. at 11-13 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).  
 
31 Id. at 12 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).  
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decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, which supported his expansive 
view of the Constitution’s “liberty” interest: 
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the 
European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers 
and to today’s case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was 
a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual 
conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right … The court 
held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1981) Par. 52. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council 
of Europe … the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim 
put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.32 
Thus, in addition to relying upon domestic development both prior and subsequent to 
Bowers33, Justice Kennedy ushered in a new jurisprudence utilized foreign sources of law 
to inform his “progressive” jurisprudence and, ultimately, domestic constitutional 
decision-making:  
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it 
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected 
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has not followed Bowers but 
its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P.G. & J.H. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, Par. 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 25, 2001) … 
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the 
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual 
conduct … The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no 
showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing 
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.34 
Ultimately, therefore, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence underscores his 
commitment to a “progressive” approach to constitutional interpretation in “values 
based” adjudication, and to using foreign sources of law as a method by which to divine 
 
32 Id. at 12 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 
33 Id. at 13-14 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (discussing Bowers subsequent erosion by in Casey and Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 
34 Id. at 16 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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the “emerging awareness”35 that characterizes such jurisprudence.   In other words, the 
use of foreign sources of law is an important aspect of Justice Breyer’s progressive 
jurisprudence, and will be analyzed infra Part III. 
 B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM” IN LAWRENCE 
In stark contrast to Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” was Justice Scalia’s dissent, 
which re-affirmed his commitment to an “originalist” method of constitutional 
interpretation in “values based” adjudication.36 In fact, arguably reflecting his 
commitment to interpreting the Constitution solely in accordance with historical 
perspectives, Justice Scalia went so far as to declare in Lawrence that “there is no right to 
‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause, though today’s opinion repeatedly makes that 
claim.”37 Indeed, Justice Scalia believes that the Due Process Clause grants procedural 
rather than substantive protection, leading to his statement in Lawrence that “[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of “liberty”, so 
long as “due process of law” is provided ...”38 
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s threshold assumption that the Due Process 
Clause protects procedural, rather than substantive rights, reflects an “originalist” 
perspective that could not be more at odds with Justice Breyer’s “progressivism”. In any 
event, to the extent that Justice Scalia recognizes the existence of “substantive” rights 
 
35 Id. at 11 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
36 As stated supra note 14, there exist many variations of the “originalist” philosophy that are advocated by 
scholars, commentators and judges. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the myriad components 
of “originalism”, and the various contexts to which it is applied. Rather, this paper strives to analyze Justice 
Scalia’s use of originalism in Lawrence, and as a method of constitutional adjudication in “values based” 
adjudication.  
 
37 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
38 Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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within the Due Process Clause, he is  to careful to note that “w[e] have held repeatedly … 
that only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called “heightened scrutiny” protection—
that is, rights which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”39 Thus, for 
Justice Scalia, a right qualifies as fundamental under the Due Process Clause only if it is 
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people … [and that it be] an interest 
traditionally protected by our society.”40 Accordingly, apart from “those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”,41 
“[a]ll other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted 
state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”42 Applying this 
framework, Justice Scalia relied upon the traditions, customs and practices of the fifty 
states to arrive at the “definitive [historical] conclusion”43 that “our Nation has a long 
history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general—regardless of whether it was performed 
by same sex or opposite sex couples.”44 On this basis alone, Justice Scalia would have 
found that a contemporary law prohibiting consensual sodomy was well within a State’s 
constitutional prerogative.  
 
39 Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721) Justice Scalia also 
noted that a “fundamental liberty interest” must also be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” so that 
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed”) (quoting Washington, 521 U.S. at 721). 
 
40 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 8-9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993); 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
 
41 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923) (emphasis added). 
 
42 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 
43 Id. at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at  7 (brackets in original). 
 
44 Id. at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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More fundamentally, Justice Scalia’s “originalism” entirely rejects the “emerging 
awareness” analysis that characterizes Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” and, in particular, 
the use of foreign sources of law to divine evolving notions of liberty. As he noted in 
Lawrence, “an ‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition[s]’45, as we have said “fundamental right” status requires.”46 In 
Justice Scalia’s view, therefore, “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence 
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain 
behavior.”47 Perhaps most importantly, according to Justice Scalia, the use of foreign 
sources of law is a particularly troubling and should have no place whatsoever in the 
Court’s domestic, “values based” constitutional analysis: 
Much less do they [fundamental rights] spring into existence … because 
foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never 
relied on “values we share with a wider civilization” … but rather rejected the 
claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” … Bowers … holding is likewise 
devoid of any reliance on the views of a “wider civilization” … the Court’s 
discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that 
have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy .. is therefore meaningless 
dicta.48 
Such reliance, moreover, is particularly “dangerous” because “this Court … should not 
impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans.”49 This statement reflects a core 
criticism that Justice Scalia espouses regarding “progressivism”, namely, that “traditional 
 
45 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 
46 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
47 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
48 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-194) (emphasis in original). 
 
49 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n. (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari). 
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democratic action should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 
‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.”50 
Ultimately, the approaches advocated by Justices Breyer and Scalia raise the 
fundamental question of whether “progressivism” or “originalism” represents the best 
method by which to adjudicate “values based” disputes. The answer to this question first 
requires a brief analysis of each theory’s benefits and limitations, after which the concept 
of “reverse originalism” is introduced.  
PART III 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN “VALUES BASED” ADJUDICATION: JUSTICE 
BREYER’S “PROGRESSIVISM” OR JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM”? 
 
The Lawrence decision underscores the significant divide between Justice 
Breyer’s and Justice Scalia’s constitutional methodology in “values-based” adjudication. 
Indeed, Lawrence raises the critical question of whether “progressivism” or “originalism” 
represents the more effective method by which to decide the fundamental constitutional 
questions that “values” based adjudication presents. As a threshold matter, this Article 
presupposes that the preferable approach is one that leads to results that are consonant 
with contemporary notions of fairness and equality, yet also remains faithful to the 
traditions and practices upon which our constitutional jurisprudence is predicated. 
Importantly, a brief examination of both approaches, including their benefits and 
limitations, reveals that a combination of these interpretive methods would most 
effectively yield a “values based” jurisprudence that responds to contemporary 
perspectives while respecting our Nation’s historical underpinnings. Such a combination, 
termed “reverse” or “negative” originalism, is introduced infra Part IV. 
 
50 Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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A. JUSTICE BREYER’S “PROGRESSIVISM” – RELIANCE ON FOREIGN 
SOURCES OF LAW TO DIVINE AN “EMERGING AWARENESS”
Importantly, perhaps the most critical component of Justice Breyer’s 
“progressive” analysis in Lawrence was his reliance upon foreign sources of law, 
particularly decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, to inform his 
determination that there existed an “emerging awareness” in favor of protecting private 
consensual homosexual conduct. Indeed, the very concept of an “emerging awareness” 
arguably implies, although does not ensure, that a court will look beyond a country’s 
geographic borders to determine, as Justice Breyer noted, whether the “wider 
civilization”51 evinces a predilection or tendency to protect a newly asserted right.  
In any event, Justice Breyer’s use of “progressivism” expressly endorses, refers to 
and relies upon foreign sources of law to inform “values based” constitutional analysis. 
The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether reliance upon foreign sources of law is a viable 
method by which to adjudicate domestic, “values based” constitutional adjudication.  An 
examination of this question reveals that Justice Breyer’s reliance upon foreign sources of 
law, specifically decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, raises several 
concerns that caution against relying too heavily upon the laws and decisions of foreign 
jurisdictions to resolve domestic constitutional disputes. 
1. JUSTICE BREYER’S RELIANCE UPON JURISPRUDENCE FROM 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – HIGHLIGHTING 
THE PROBLEMS OF USING FOREIGN SOURCES OF LAW IN 
DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES.
As set forth above, in Lawrence Justice Breyer relied upon decisional law from 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), that prohibited the criminalization of 
 
51 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 16 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
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consensual homosexual sodomy. Specifically, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom52, a case 
cited by Justice Breyer in his majority opinion, the ECHR held that consensual 
homosexual conduct was a protected “privacy” right pursuant to Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.53 Significantly, therefore, Justice Breyer’s 
reliance upon the ECHR (and other sources of foreign law) was an important aspect of 
his “progressivism”, namely, his belief that an “emerging awareness” existed in favor of 
prohibiting the criminalization of consensual homosexual conduct.  Critically, however, 
such reliance raises legitimate concerns that courts must address when using foreign 
sources of law to support domestic constitutional decisions.  
Indeed, as set forth below, Justice Breyer’s reliance upon ECHR precedent raises 
implicates several problematic issues that caution against relying too heavily upon 
foreign sources of law to support constitutional decisions in the domestic context.   
 
a. As a Human Rights Court, the ECHR Performs A Different 
Institutional Role In Interpreting An International Treaty  
 
To begin with, as an institutional matter the ECHR is responsible for interpreting 
and applying the European Convention on Human Rights, which is viewed as an 
international treaty and not a domestic constitutional text.54 This distinction is not without 
a difference, because the ECHR’s institutional role arguably implicates different 
 
52 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981), Par. 52, as cited in Lawrence, supra note 3, at 12 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
53 Id.
54 See Paul De Hert, “Balancing security and liberty within the European human rights framework. A 
critical reading of the Court’s case law in light of surveillance and criminal law enforcement strategies 
after 9/11” http://www.ultrechtlawreview.org/ Volume, 1, Issue 1 at 71 (2005) (stating that “the 
Convention is not a Constitution but a Treaty. After ratification it does not automatically form part of the 
domestic legal orders of a Member State … Although the Court has referred to the Convention as “a 
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)”, it has accepted the treaty-like status of 
the Convention”) (citation omitted). 
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considerations, both as a matter philosophy and interpretation, when adjudicating human 
rights (as opposed to domestic constitutional) disputes. As an initial matter, the ECHR is 
an international, rather than domestic court, and its overriding purpose is to effectuate, 
and arguably expand, the broad human rights guarantees of an international treaty. The 
ECHR’s institutional role, therefore, is both more specific and far broader than that of a 
domestic constitutional court because its primary role is to interpret and provide 
substantive meaning to a document (the Convention) whose provisions are unified by an 
overriding human rights objective. Indeed, the specific objective of the ECHR’s mission 
necessarily entails the use of interpretive methods that differ vastly from a domestic 
constitutional court, which often construes provisions within a constitution that are 
separate from, unrelated to and not connected by a single overriding purpose. As a result, 
unlike a domestic constitutional court, the ECHR’s specifically defined institutional role 
creates a paramount value upon which its jurisprudence is developed.  
The narrower nature of the ECHR’s institutional purpose, however, is enhanced 
by the fact that, as an international court interpreting an international treaty, it is not 
bound by the traditional temporal and/or geographic limitations to which domestic 
constitutional courts often believe themselves to be bound.   For example, as expressed 
by Justice Scalia in Lawrence, a domestic constitutional court, when interpreting a 
national constitution, may limit itself to analyzing the history, customs, traditions and/or 
practices of its country, while eschewing the consideration of sources from beyond its 
borders.55 This significance of this concept is that a domestic constitutional court’s 
jurisprudence often imposes constraints upon itself that results in jurisprudence uniquely 
personal to its territorial jurisdiction. In this way, the perspectives of a domestic 
 
55 See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional court are likely, although not certain, to differ substantially from those of 
an international human rights court, because the sources of decision-making are  
different. Stated simply, the legal dynamics between the ECHR and domestic 
constitutional courts are quite distinct, as the ECHR has at its disposal a significantly 
broader array of law, tradition and custom upon which to inform its human rights-based 
jurisprudence. This fact that is perhaps best underscored in the differing interpretive 
methodology that the ECHR employs in “values based” adjudication. 
b. The ECHR’s Status as an International Human Rights Court, 
Which Interprets an International Human Rights Treaty, 
Engenders a Distinct Interpretive Methodology than Those 
Employed by Many Domestic Constitutional Courts.
The concerns raised by incorporation of ECHR precedent in American 
constitutional law are underscored by the fact that both courts arguably employ different 
interpretive methodologies. First, because the Convention enjoys the status of an 
international treaty, the ECHR interprets its provisions, inter alia, in accordance with 
international law principles.56 Indeed, in Golder v. United Kingdom57, the Court stated 
that interpretation of the Convention’s provisions would be guided by the interpretive 
methods established at the 1989 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.58 The 
 
56 See Christian Bonat, The European Court of Human Rights, published by The Federalist Society for Law 
and Public Policy Studies, at 19 [hardcopy available upon request].  
 
57 1 E.H.H.R. 524 (1979-80), as cited in Bonat, supra note 56, at 19. 
 
58 See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, European Journal of International Law (2003) at 
533-538 (discussing relevant methods of treaty interpretation, including: (1) the plain meaning as 
understood in light of the object and purpose of a treaty; (2) subsequent practice; (3) relevant rules of 
international law; and (4) preparatory work. 
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international focus of the Court’s jurisprudence, therefore, only re-enforces the differing 
approach to constitutional interpretation that the ECHR and U.S. Supreme Court apply.59 
Of more consequence, however, is the “dynamic” or “evolving” method of 
interpretation that the ECHR has increasingly employed in its jurisprudence. Ostensibly 
arising from Article 31(1) the Vienna Convention, stating that the terms of a treaty should 
be interpreted in light of its object and purpose60, the ECHR has adopted a “dynamic” 
approach that views the Convention as “a living instrument which … must be interpreted 
in light of present-day conditions.”61 Indeed, the ECHR’s dynamic approach manifests 
itself through the “effectiveness principle”, in which the Court stresses that the 
Convention “is intended to guarantee ‘not rights that are theoretical or illusory but 
practical and effective’”62:
Regarding the former, the Court will interpret the Convention’s provisions in 
order to make them ‘practical and effective’ in servicing the broad objective it 
has adopted. Thus, if the treaty by its plain language is not ‘effectively’ 
protecting a particular right, the Court will see fit to make it so through 
expansive interpretation.63 
In essence “the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection 
of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to 
 
59 This proposition is not without qualification, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court, in certain contexts, 
i.e., Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, looks beyond its borders to “evolving standards of decency” both 
domestically and abroad. 
 
60 See, e.g., Orakhelashvili, supra note 58.  
 
61 See Bonat, supra note 56, at 21-23. 
 
62 Hert, supra note 54, at 74 (quoting Airey v. Ireland, Oct. 9, 1979 at Par. 24) 
 
63 Bonat, supra note 56,  at 19-20. 
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make its safeguards practical and effective … any interpretation must be consistent with 
… the ideals and values of a democratic society.”64 
The Court’s “living document” philosophy is also reflected in the “consensus 
doctrine,” a method by which the Court “finds an internal European consensus, assumes 
this increase in rights was done in fealty to the Convention, and then imposes this new 
standard on the straggling state.”65 For example, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,66 the 
Court “looked outside of Europe and found an international ‘common ground’ granting 
full legal recognition of gender reassigned transsexuals…”67 In accordance with its 
“evolving” method of interpretation, the Court stated that “while there had not been a 
statistical increase in States giving full legal recognition of gender re-assignment within 
Europe, information from outside Europe showed developments in that direction.”68 
Thus, Goodwin not only underscores the Court’s expansive view of the Convention’s 
provisions, but “by reaching beyond Europe explicitly connects the Court’s interpretation 
with evolving international human rights standards.”69 Lastly, in certain areas, the 
Court’s expansive jurisprudence has resulted in the imposition of “positive obligations” 
upon member states, that is, a requirement that a particular member state undertake 
measures to ensure the effectuation of a particular right.70 
64 Id. at 22 (quoting Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), Par. 102)). 
 
65 See Bonat, supra note 56, at 23.  
 
66 35 E.H.R.R. 18 (2002), Par. 85. 
 
67 See Bonat, supra note 56, at 24. 
 
68 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 
69 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
 
70 Id. at 22. 
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Importantly, the ECHR’s dynamic, “living document” philosophy has resulted in 
very expansive decisions that most American courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme 
Court, would be unlikely to countenance. This proposition is evident in the ECHR’s 
“privacy” jurisprudence, particularly in the area of “relational” privacy, which arises 
under Article 8 of the convention.71 For example, in A.D.T. v. United Kingdom72, the 
Court held that the United Kingdom’s “Sexual Offenses Act of 1967” violated Article 8 
because, although it decriminalized homosexual conduct, it expressly prohibited such 
conduct where more than two individuals were present.73 Likewise, in Goodwin, supra,74 
the Court accorded full legal recognition to transsexuals, and thereafter, in Van Kuck v. 
Germany,75 expanded the rights of transsexuals, finding that German courts violated 
Article 8 when they failed to define gender reassignment surgery as “necessary medical 
treatment”76 and thus eligible for reimbursement by a private insurance company.77 
71 Article 8 of the Convention provides that “ (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and 
freedoms of others.” There exists a doctrinally rich body of law concerning the ECHR’s interpretation of 
Article 8, particularly with respect to those acts by member states that are “in accordance with law”; 
“necessary in a democratic society”; and “in the interests of … health or morals”. Such discussion is 
beyond the scope of this paper, except to highlight the expansive interpretive method that the ECHR 
employs.  
 
72 E.C.H.R. App. No. 35765/97 (July 21, 2000). 
 
73 Id. at Par. 37. 
 
74 35 E.H.R.R. 18 (2002), Par. 85. 
 
75 E.C.H.R. App. No. 35968/97 (June 12, 2003) at Pars. 81, 82 and 85. 
 
76 Id.
77 Id. These cases are but a sample of those that reflect the Court’s expansive approach to matters involving 
basic rights such as privacy. Indeed, the expansiveness of the Court’s jurisprudence, as compared to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, is reflected by the fact that the case relied upon by Justice Breyer in Lawrence,
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, was decided over 25 years earlier.  
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Likewise, in the area of “zonal” or “territorial” privacy, the Court, in Von Hannover v. 
Germany78, held that Princess Carolina’s right to privacy under Article 8 was violated 
when she was photographed by media officials while engaging in leisurely activities 
outside of her residence.79 Additionally, in Peck v. United Kingdom,80 the Court held that 
a British citizen, who was located by police attempting to commit suicide in a public 
place, and otherwise exhibiting erratic behavior, suffered a violation of his privacy where 
a videotape of the event was televised by national and local media outlets.81 
Significantly, the evolving nature of the Court’s Article 8 jurisprudence is further 
underscored by dicta in these (and other) decisions that delineate the expanding nature of 
privacy rights in Europe. For example, in Goodwin the Court stated that “serious 
interference with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an 
important aspect of personal identity … [because] the stress and alienation arising from 
the discordance between the [person’s] position in society … cannot … be regarded as a 
minor inconvenience …”82 Likewise, in Van Kuck, the Court indicated that the concept of 
“private life” is very broad and “covers the physical and psychological integrity of the 
person,” which encompasses “an individual’s physical and social identity … personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
 
78 App. No. 59320/00 (June 2004). 
 
79 Id. at Pars. 76-80.  
 
80 App. No. 44647/98 (January 28, 2003). 
 
81 Id. at Pars. 86 and 87. 
 
82 Goodwin, supra note 66, at Par. 77. (emphasis added) (the Court also held that “the very essence of the 
Convention being respect for human dignity and freedom, protection is given to the right of transsexuals to 
personal development and to physical and moral security”) Id. at Par. 70. 
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beings and the outside world.”83 Additionally, in Von Hannover, the Court stated that 
notions of private life are designed to “ensure the development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human 
beings [in the public domain].”84 The right to privacy, moreover, “includes a social 
dimension”,85 that extends “into the “public context”86 and “may include activities of a 
professional or business nature.”87 
The Court’s privacy jurisprudence is significant because it highlights both the 
courts differing institutional role, and jurisprudential focus, from that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. First, its decisional law under Article 8 demonstrates that  the ECHR is 
arguably committed to expanding the concept of privacy to the outer limits of what can 
be deemed an “international consensus.” In other words, its view of Article 8 is primarily 
forward-looking and progressive, as its precedent shows few, if any, strict limitations 
upon an individual’s right to private life. Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
approach, which is arguably informed by its responsibility to interpret a constitutional 
text, reflects the fact that the Constitution both grants and restricts the fundamental 
guarantees that it embodies. In this way, these respective Courts serve different 
institutional roles by virtue of the fact that they are interpreting very different documents, 
which not only have different purposes and objectives, but derive from a different 
historical dynamic. This notion, therefore, is at least partially responsible for the differing 
 
83 Van Kuck, supra note 71, at Par. 69.  
 
84 Von Hannover, supra note 73, at Par. 50 (emphasis added).  
 
85 Id. at Par. 69. 
 
86 Id. at Par. 50. 
 
87 Peck, supra note 80, at Par. 57. 
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degrees of protection that privacy engenders in the European Union as opposed to the 
United States. Consequently, to the extent that judges, i.e., Justice Breyer, rely upon 
foreign law to support a domestic constitutional decision, such reliance must consider not 
merely the judgments themselves, but also the institutions and doctrinal bases from which 
they emanate.  
c. The ECHR is not as Committed to the Democratic Premise of    
Majoritarianism 
Another substantial difference is that the ECHR, particularly in the area of 
“morals” legislation, is not nearly as deferential to Member States, and this is reflected in 
its tendency to de-emphasize the “margin of appreciation”88 doctrine and, in some cases, 
impose positive obligations upon states to ensure realization of a particular right.  As a 
threshold matter, the “margin of appreciation” is designed, in theory, to accord some 
measure of deference to Member States’ legislative enactment.89 As a practical matter, 
particularly in morals or public welfare legislation, the Court has been reticent to apply 
this doctrine with any degree of consistency. For example, in Norris v. Ireland90, the 
Court stated that “not only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of 
the activities involved will affect the scope of the margin of appreciation.”91 Thus, in 
cases implicating “a most intimate aspect of private life … there must exist particularly 
serious reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities can be legitimate.”92 
88 See, e.g., Bonat, supra note 56, at 25 (stating that, as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is 
accorded to the parties.”) (emphasis in original). 
 
89 Id.
90 App. No. 10581/83 (October 26, 1988).  
 
91 Id. at Par. 46 (quoting Dudgeon , supra note 52, at Par. 52).  
 
92 Norris, supra note 90, at Par. 46. 
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In fact, in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom93, the Court held that “serious 
reasons” exist only where the legislation at issue “answers a pressing social need”94 and 
is “proportionate”95 to the asserted objective. However, as Bonat states, “[t]here is no 
hard and fast rule on scope of the margin of appreciation … [i]t is a self-regulating 
doctrine for the Court, and as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is accorded 
to the parties.”96 Thus, the uneven (and uncertain) degree to which the Court will apply 
the “margin of appreciation”, coupled with the application of “positive obligations” in 
some cases, substantially eviscerates any meaningful deference to Member States where 
fundamental rights are implicated. 
Indeed, pursuant to the related (although distinct), doctrine of “positive 
obligations”, the Court has held that Article 8 “does not merely compel the State to 
abstain from such [arbitrary] interference [with privacy] … there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life … [which] may 
involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”97 To be fair, however, 
pursuant to the doctrine of “subsidiarity”, the Member States “are primarily responsible 
 
93 App. Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96 (September 27, 1999). 
 
94 Id. at Par. 80. 
 
95 Id.
96 Bonat, supra note 56, at 25 (emphasis in original).  
 
97 Von Hannover, supra note 78, at Par. 57 (emphasis added). 
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for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the Convention, so it falls to the State in 
question how it is to comply with the Court’s decision.”98 
Not insignificantly, the Court’s activist approach differs substantially from the 
deference that American courts generally afford to state legislative enactments, 
particularly in the context of morals. Again, this is due both to the American 
constitutional structure as well as the legal framework adopted by particular courts.  For 
example, the Constitution creates a system of enumerated powers that vests with 
individual states the primary legislative authority in areas such as health, welfare and 
public safety.99 Of course, while there is an ongoing debate regarding the degree of 
deference to be accorded in particular cases100, the fact remains that, in a significant 
majority of cases involving “values” or “morality”, courts are ordinarily circumspect not 
to substitute their subjective policy predilections for those of a particular state legislature. 
Conversely, while recognizing this principle in theory, the ECHR’s application of the 
“margin of appreciation”, coupled with its imposition of positive obligations upon 
member states, suggest that it is, at least in certain areas, far more willing to invalidate 
legislation that arguably furthers legitimate objectives, and upon which reasonable minds 
could conceivably disagree. To be sure, the ECHR’s activist role represents a logical 
outgrowth of its dynamic interpretive method, which consistently strives to broaden the 
Convention’s human rights guarantees despite, in some cases, the absence of a European 
 
98 Bonat, supra note 56, at 14. 
 
99 See U.S. Constitution, Amendment X. 
 
100 The debate over the proper degree of deference is based often upon each judge’s individual judicial 
philosophy , but the concept that State legislative enactments should not be invalidated based upon a 
court’s subjective policy predilections is firmly embedded in American jurisprudence.  The ongoing debate 
regarding the scope of such deference is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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consensus.101 However, the Court’s evolving judicial philosophy is incompatible with the 
recognition by most American jurists that legislative promulgations, as a core product of 
democratic processes, federalism and majority rule, should not be readily invalidated 
based upon a mere desire to expand or otherwise arrive at more desirable policy 
outcomes.102 As one commentator has noted, “[e]uropean constitutional tradition 
contemplates ‘a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their 
authority from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain national 
self-government.”103 
Ultimately, therefore, because there is a considerable difference in the deference 
pursuant to which the American courts and ECHR will review “values” based legislation, 
there will undoubtedly be instances where the ECHR would likely reach a different 
results in cases involving similar facts.104 Aside from the fact that this important 
distinction results largely from each courts’ respective institutional role, and the 
documents from which they derive their respective authority, it counsels against relying 
 
101 See Bonat, supra note 56, at 24 (discussing the Court’s approach in Goodwin, where it states as follows: 
“[t]e Court … attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach … than to 
the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favor not only of increased social 
acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals”). 
 
102 Of course, the structure of the European Union or, for that matter, the Member States, differs from that 
of the United State’s federal structure, rendering a strict comparison based upon principles of majority rule 
and federalism somewhat dubious. However, there is substantial conceptual similarity between the ECHR’s 
and American court’s invalidation of laws promulgated pursuant to the legislative processes of Member 
States, because in both instances such laws are within the State’s traditional sphere of authority and often 
the product of majority predilection. 
 
103 Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, Hoover Institution Policy Review, at 
http://www.policyreview.org/jun05/anderson.html (2005) (emphasis added) . 
 
104 See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 66.  It is respectfully submitted that the American courts, at least in the 
current judicial climate, would not recognize, must less require, a state legislature to recognize the rights of 
transsexuals. 
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too heavily upon foreign sources of law, at least without due regard to the unique 
institutional nuances that facilitate particular decision-making processes.   
d. Foreign Sources of Law Are the Product of Unique Cultural, 
Social, Economic and Political Dynamics 
 
Finally, as alluded to above, foreign court decisions do not exist in isolation, but 
are instead responsive to the unique historical, cultural and constitutional traditions that 
influence a court’s perspective. For example, as Kenneth Anderson explains, unlike the 
United States, Western European constitutionalism does not place emphasis upon the 
primacy of democratic self-governance and national majoritarian prerogatives:  
[F]ollowing the nationalist disasters of the interwar and Second World War 
period, much of Western Europe’s constitutionalism was explicitly about 
reaching to any available source of constitutionalism other than national 
democratic self-government, which, equated with populism, was seen in no 
small part as a root evil of war and social strife. It is a tradition deeply fearful 
of democracy and above all hostile to the concept of popular sovereignty. 
Indeed, in international constitutionalism, ‘interpretation by a body of 
international jurists is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local 
interpretation, which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and 
ideological political disputes’.105 
Importantly, this approach differs dramatically from the American perspective, which 
“regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation’s democratically 
self-given legal and political commitments … [American] constitutional law is 
emphatically not antidemocratic … [but] aims at democracy over time.”106 In this way, 
“those who interpret its constitutional text owe their allegiance to … [a] democratic, self-
governing community.”107 
105 Anderson, supra note 103, at http://www.policyreview.org/jun05/anderson.html (emphasis in original). 
 
106 Id.
107Id.
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The difficulty, therefore, in relying upon foreign sources of law, as Justice Breyer 
did in Lawrence, is that it may not be sufficiently mindful of the vastly different 
historical, cultural and constitutional perspectives that inform a particular decision. This 
problem is no more evident than when comparing Western European and American 
constitutionalism, particularly the ECHR’s jurisprudence, because, in stark contrast to its 
dynamic framework, in the United States “[c]onstitutional interpretation is not merely a 
matter of ‘best policy’, considered in a vacuum, but ‘best policy’ as it has arisen through 
democratic processes—which may or may not have been successful in reaching the best 
policy.”108 In other words, American constitutionalism represents “a vision of democratic 
constitutional self-government founded upon democracy and popular sovereignty – 
everything that international constitutionalism and the European tradition most 
rejects.”109 
Thus, the problems that “comparative constitutionalism” engender militate against 
relying too heavily upon foreign court decisions in the domestic constitutional context. 
Indeed, the presence of widely divergent historical, cultural and constitutional traditions 
requires, at the very least, that judges comprehend the context within which a foreign 
decision was rendered, a task that may itself be impractical. Moreover, the sheer volume 
of foreign materials upon which a court may elect to rely can, conceivably, create the 
appearance of self-serving expedience or, far worse, render such reliance susceptible to 
claims of arbitrariness   In addition, venturing outside of the domestic constitutional 
context risks engendering the claim that a particular judge (or court) is acting in an elitist 
 
108 Id.
109 Id.
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manner that is intended to further a subjective policy predilection not supported by 
domestic law and tradition.  Such a claim would be particularly troubling in the American 
constitutional structure, because its tradition explicitly emphasizes national democratic 
self-government and respect for majority will. Thus, “ comparative constitutionalism” 
raises substantial concerns that cannot be vitiated by claims that such reliance is merely 
for “informative” purposes.110 
Of course, this does not mean that foreign sources should not serve to support 
domestic decision in some instances, but the manner and method by which such use is 
sanctioned is not certain. This Article does not claim that foreign sources of law should 
never be used, but rather that its use in “values” based adjudication should be done, if at 
all, cautiously and with particular sensitivity attention to the historical traditions of the 
domestic nation. Critically, though, this claim substantially undermines Justice Breyer’s 
“progressivism”, because a substantial component of that approach is to rely upon foreign 
sources of law to discern a rights-based consensus. However, the answer to this problem 
does not necessarily entail elimination of Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” as a viable 
methodology in “values” based cases, nor, as discussed below, does it support the 
proposition that Justice Scalia’s “originalism” should guide the Court’s interpretive 
framework.  
 
110 Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (March 1, 2005) (In Roper, as Anderson notes, Justice 
Breyer “endorsed the use of foreign and international law in U.S. constitutional adjudication”); see also 
Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution, Cato Supreme Court Review (2004) 
(hardcopy available upon request); Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 
Texas Law. Rev. 1763 (2004). 
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B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM” -- PROBLEMS WITH EXCLUSIVE 
RELIANCE UPON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 
As stated supra, in Lawrence Justice Scalia eschewed the majority’s reliance upon 
foreign jurisprudence, dismissing such reliance as “meaningless dicta” that sought to 
“impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”111 For Justice Scalia, the only 
values, or rights, that are worthy of constitutional protection are those that are “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”112 To be sure, the asserted right must “be an 
interest traditionally protected by our society”113 and “so rooted … in the conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”114 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted in 
Lawrence that, even if a right is designated as fundamental, it is not immune from 
restriction should an individual state proffer a compelling interest justifying its 
infringement.115 Moreover, all other asserted “liberty” interests, “may be abridged or 
abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”116 Applying his “originalist” philosophy, Justice Scalia 
surveyed the historical landscape, particularly state legislative enactments and, far from 
discerning an interest “traditionally protected by our society”117, found that “our Nation 
has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general…”118 Accordingly, 
 
111 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
112 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-194) (emphasis in original). 
 
113 Id. at  8 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 at 122). 
 
114 Id. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 303). 
 
115 Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting); (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). 
 
116 Id at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
117 Id. at  9 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 at 122). 
 
118 Id. at  11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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Justice Scalia would have upheld the State of Texas’ prohibition upon consensual 
sodomy, even though it was directed at same-sex couples, because the historical tradition 
of prohibiting such conduct existed “regardless of whether it was performed by same-sex 
or opposite-sex couples.”119 Importantly, it is not surprising that, for Justice Scalia, the 
use of foreign law in this context was not only “meaningless dicta”120, but contrary the 
requirement that fundamental rights be rooted in domestic tradition and practice. Thus, 
Justice Scalia’s “originalist” philosophy in “values” based constitutional adjudication 
provides no basis whatsoever for relying upon foreign sources of law.121 
However, Justice Scalia’s “originalism” in this context is not without its 
conceptual and practical difficulties. First, despite the ease with which Justice Scalia 
apparently discerns domestic constitutional tradition relating to a particular issue, such 
endeavor can prove elusive and, in some case, lead to inconsistent, uncertain or contrary 
views on precisely what this Nation’s historical practice communicates. The domestic 
historical record, whether it be law, custom, or practice, is not likely to provide a 
straightforward answer to questions regarding the specific rights that should be deemed 
fundamental. In fact, the record may be susceptible to varying degrees of interpretation 
that depends more upon how the inquiry is framed, rather than upon the existence of a 
traditional consensus. In other words, reliance upon history and tradition is capable of the 
same arbitrary and self-serving reliance that the use of foreign law potentially risks.  
 
119 Id. at  11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
120 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
121 For further discussion of Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy, see John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and 
the Legislative Process, 62 Ann. Surv. Amer. Law 33 (2006); see also Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson, 
Original Intent, and the Shaping of American Law: Learning Constitutional Law from the Writing of 
Jefferson (same). 
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In Lawrence, for example, Justice Breyer disputed Justice Scalia’s view that there 
existed a “long-standing history in this country of laws” proscribing homosexual 
conduct.122 Of course, Justice Scalia responded by asserting that traditional practice 
prohibited sodomy in general, underscoring that the method by which a court frames the 
relevant inquiry can have a direct impact upon such court’s interpretation of historical 
practice. In any event, the sheer volume of the historical traditions or practices to which 
Justice Scalia speaks are not likely to provide straightforward guidance in specific cases.  
Second, and more fundamentally, “originalism” can result in unjust decisions that, 
based upon contemporary perspectives, are inconsistent with modern notions of liberty 
and equality.123 Stated simply, it can lead to harsh, even absurd, results. For example, in 
an article discussing Cass Sunstein’s “Radicals in Robes: Why Right-Wing Courts are 
Wrong For America”, Stephen Pomper discusses the implications of the “originalist” 
approach: 
Sunstein’s main objections to originalism don’t have to do with its theoretical 
vulnerabilities … [h]is principle objections are about the results that it would 
produce … If applied in its most literal sense, the theory would force the 
courts to peel away decades of constitutional law, and return the Constitution 
to the state it was in prior to the New Deal … A rigid application of 
originalism would, for example, gut the case law on reproductive freedom … 
[and] on relatively uncontroversial issues like the right of married persons to 
buy birth control … [a]nd it would have a bizarre impact on the law in areas 
relating to race and religion … originalism tends to suggest that states can 
actually establish their own religions … [a]nd there’s pretty much no 
 
122 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 7 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
123 Of course, the debate concerning the implications of originalist philosophy, including the results that it 
would create, is the subject of extensive commentary which is beyond the scope of this Article. In addition, 
because originalist philosophy exists in numerous forms, and is advocated to varying degrees, there can be 
no certain conclusions regarding the results that its application in particular forms would create. However, 
the criticism that the originalist perspective would create unjust results is not without merit if, as Justice 
Scalia advocates, courts looked exclusively to domestic practice when analyzing whether protection of a 
particular right is warranted. A contrary result in Lawrence, for example, would have engendered precisely 
this criticism. 
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originalist support for the general idea that the Constitution protects women 
from discrimination by Congress or by state legislatures … Sunstein asks: 
Does anybody really want to put on this ridiculous straightjacket?124 
Consequently, “[w]hen confronted with the parade of horribles that originalism might 
spawn … [i]t leaves us looking for another constitutional approach.”125 
But what approach to constitutional interpretation can most effectively bridge 
the divide between the Justice Breyer’s “progressivism (results consistent with 
modern notions of liberty), and Justice Scalia’s “originalism” (fidelity to domestic 
historical tradition and democratic process)? This Article proposes a modest solution 
to this problem by introducing the concept of “reverse” originalism.  
PART IV 
 
INTRODUCING “REVERSE” ORIGINALISM – A PROGRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE THAT 
REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE UNITED STATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL 
TRADITIONS 
The significant divide between Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” and Justice 
Scalia’s “originalism” suggests that reliance upon evolving notions of fairness and 
liberty, based upon domestic and foreign perspectives, cannot be reconciled with a 
court’s duty to remain firmly committed to domestic history and tradition. In fact, Justice 
Breyer’s reliance upon the European Court of Human Rights conflicts directly with 
Justice Scalia’s belief that the only rights worthy of protection are those that are “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s”126 historical tradition.  
 
124 Stephen Pomper, Judging the Judges, in Washington Monthly (September 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.pomper.html (reviewing Cass Sunstein, “Radicals 
in Robes: Why Extreme Right Wing Courts Are Wrong For America”, (Basic Books 2005). 
 
125 Id. In Radicals in Robes, Sunstein advocates a “minimalist” approach to constitutional interpretation 
which, broadly construed, “prefers that the law be changed through narrow rulings and small nudges rather 
than precedent-setting earthquakes”).  
126 Lawrence, supra note 3, at (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. 193-194). 
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The more fundamental question, however, concerns the purposes underlying 
Justice’s Breyer’s reliance upon foreign sources f law, and stated position that “history 
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive 
due process inquiry.”127 It would not be unfair, or unduly speculative, to assume that the 
Lawrence opinion reflected a Supreme Court trying to achieve the “best policy,” or result 
that is most consistent with evolving perspectives of equality, liberty and fairness. Apart 
from the fact that such approach is likely to invite claims of “elitism”, judicial 
policymaking and arbitrariness, the fact remains that the Lawrence majority was, at its 
core, trying to achieve a just and equitable result for a group that has traditionally been 
underrepresented (and unprotected) in our society. Whether that result was achieved is a 
matter for debate; what is fairly uncontroversial is that “progressivism”, in its most basic 
application, arguably seeks to do that which is “right” in a particular case, and the use of 
foreign material is an important component of that search.128 
This approach could not be more in conflict with Justice Scalia’s “originalist” 
philosophy. Indeed, constitutional rights do not “spring into existence”129 simply because 
an evolving consensus supports their recognition. On the contrary, policy change falls 
squarely within the purview of democratic processes, as reflected through majority rule 
and subsequent legislative promulgation. For Justice Scalia, therefore, the Lawrence 
majority represented a circumvention of our constitutional structure “through the 
invention of a brand-new ‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic 
 
127 Id. at  11 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (quoting County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 857). 
 
128 See generally Anderson, supra note 103, at 4-8. 
 
129 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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change.”130 In Justice Scalia’s view, therefore, American constitutionalism does not rely 
upon the perspectives of a “wider civilization,”131 but instead finds expression through 
the values and policy predilections that historical domestic tradition reveals.132 
To begin with, there can be no doubt that both Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” 
and Justice Scalia’s “originalism” have critically important components that are highly 
relevant to, and a valuable aspect of, American constitutionalism. As a normative matter, 
judges should, at least to some extent, strive to achieve the “right” result, that is, results 
that are consonant with principles of fairness and equality, particularly where evolving 
notions have demonstrated an existing practice to be oppressive or unjust.  The idea that 
courts will endeavor to prohibit State action that is inimical to basic due process 
guarantees is neither novel nor suspect in our domestic practice. In fact, the Supreme 
Court’s rich doctrinal history is replete with precedent where the Court has invalidated 
long-standing practices that time has shown to be inconsistent with equal treatment.133 Of 
course, while the line between proper judicial function and undesirable judicial activism 
is often unclear, it cannot be said that a court’s scrupulous efforts to achieve the “right” 
outcome is per se objectionable. Stated simply, “progressivism” and, arguably, its desire 
to achieve equitable outcomes, should have a role in American constitutionalism. 
 
130 Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
131 Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 
132 In January 2005, Justices Breyer and Scalia held a “public conversation” at Washington College of Law, 
American University, in which their differing approaches were discusses in detail. For further discussion of 
their views, see Anderson, supra note 103. 
 
133 See e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1537 
(2004) (discussing the impact of Brown v. Board of Education upon subsequent constitutional 
jurisprudence).  
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On the other hand, a court that strives to achieve “just” outcomes through 
substitution of its policy predilections cannot be said to be acting within permissible 
boundaries. Thus, to the extent that the “right” outcome is effectuated at the expense of 
deference to a legislature’s constitutional authority, it should be exposed as intolerable 
judicial activism. In other words, if there was ever a practice that is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition”134, is the venerable respect for the legislature’s 
policymaking prerogative, both as an institution and expression of democratic processes. 
Additionally, there is in referring to, and relying upon, our historical tradition when 
determining whether an asserted “right” warrants constitutional protection. Indeed, 
domestic tradition can provide important insights regarding the intent, scope and 
purposes which underlie our most fundamental rights.  
Moreover, knowledge of that history can inform a court’s perspectives regarding 
the degree to which, as a general matter, the newly-asserted right has a cognizable basis 
in the constitutional text. Furthermore, reliance upon domestic tradition ensures that our 
social, political and cultural practices, as expressed through democratic processes and 
majority will, occupy a venerable place in constitutional decision-making. Thus, when 
confronted with “values” based adjudication, courts should be cognizant not only of their 
institutional limitations, but also of the long-standing history that informs our very notion 
of what it means to declare a newly-asserted right “fundamental”.  Put differently, the 
“originalist” position is an important aspect of American constitutional law. 
The critical problem, for which this Article proposes a modest solution, is the 
failure to realize that both the “progressive” and “originalist” philosophies can be 
integrated into a unified method of constitutional interpretation. This Article posits that 
 
134 See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-194). 
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“negative” or “reverse” originalism represents a plausible method by which to remain 
faith to historical tradition, while simultaneously achieving outcomes that are consistent 
with evolving notions of liberty. The concept of “negative” originalism is based upon the 
assumption that domestic tradition should be a core aspect of constitutional adjudication, 
because such tradition reflects the unique cultural, political and social character of 
national constitutionalism. However, “negative” originalism presupposes that the concept 
of “rights,” particularly those worthy of constitutional protection, should not remain 
stagnant or fixed in history. Rather, rights-recognition should be responsive to the 
evolving perspectives of liberty that human experience generates.  
Based upon these assumptions, the theory of “negative” originalism would require 
a court not to divine the precise meaning of broadly worded constitutional phrases, or 
divine the import of long-standing historical practice. Such an endeavor will likely entail 
distinct interpretive difficulties, be subject to contrary conclusions, and risk arbitrary 
and/or self-serving utilization. In some cases, moreover, the historical record will be 
invariably unclear and susceptible to varying interpretations, thus proving inadequate for 
constitutional decision-making processes. Furthermore, to the extent that domestic 
practice can answer modern questions of rights-protection, the result may be highly 
unjust or inequitable.  
Thus, “negative originalism” would require a court to ascertain whether 
protection of a newly-asserted right would be contrary to, inconsistent with or 
discountenanced by the salutary values that our domestic tradition embraces. In other 
words, “negative” originalism would require a court to discern the general or overriding 
principles that underlie a particular constitutional provision, i.e., the Due Process Clause, 
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or particular historical practice, i.e., race-related legislation, and examine whether the 
newly-asserted right would contravene the general intent that has manifested itself 
through evolution of domestic law. In this way, “negative” originalism would still require 
a court, particularly in “values” based cases, to conduct a searching examination of the 
historical record, as expressed through constitutional and legislative history, to ensure 
that newly-recognized “rights” are supported by domestic tradition and not the result of 
judicial policy predilection. In other words, the broad values that our country has deemed 
sacrosanct, through democratic process and majoritarian rule, warrant special recognition 
as expressions of our most deeply-held notions of liberty. Moreover, an integral aspect of 
that recognition must be rooted in judicial decision-making that strives to continue the 
evolution in “rights recognition” that this country has unquestionably undergone, yet in a 
manner that is consistent with the broad values underlying that evolution rather than 
subjective policy preferences. The failure to appreciate this fact is a recipe for judicial 
usurpation of the democratic process.  
Critically, however, the requirement that courts ascertain only the broad values or
general intent upon which domestic tradition is based reflects the principle that 
conceptions of liberty, fairness and equality evolve over the course of time and through 
the trials of human experience. Indeed, whether it be the experience of the United States 
or foreign nations, conceptions of “rights protection” are undoubtedly informed by 
human events, cultural evolution, and social awareness. For example, evolving notions of 
discriminatory treatment have resulted in increasing protection for traditionally 
disadvantages groups, i.e., women, minorities and homosexuals, through legislative 
action and policy reform. Furthermore, evolutions in the very principles that formed our 
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national constitutionalism have resulted in a society that most would agree is more fair, 
equal, and free. Indeed, the judiciary has played a vital role in eradicating, through 
landmark decisional law, various oppressive practices that evolving conceptions would 
likely not tolerate. Stated simply, “negative” originalism recognizes that “values” based 
adjudication must allow for the benefits that modern notions of liberty and fairness will 
provide.  
In addition, “negative” originalism reflects the fact that, in modern jurisprudence, 
difficult issues invariably arise that could neither be contemplated by the drafters of our 
Constitution nor resolved by reference to historical tradition. It is simply impossible to 
expect that the Constitution’s drafters, or early legislative efforts, could have anticipated 
the many difficult issues that would arise in the context of rights-protection. The broad 
text of the Constitution’s many provisions, i.e., the Equal Protection Clause, arguably 
serve, at least in part, as a testament to this notion. However, while various contemporary 
“values” disputes could not have been anticipated or foreseen, the Constitution does set 
forth broad provisions concerning liberty that can inform resolution of these disputes. It is 
precisely for this reason that the broad guarantees upon which, for example, the Due 
Process Clause is based, are relevant to answering the questions posed in “values” based 
adjudication.  As such, “negative” originalism contemplates an active role for courts in 
discerning whether recognition of a newly-asserted right would contravene the salutary 
principles that influenced the evolution of domestic tradition and practice. Importantly, 
while “negative” originalism only requires courts to discern the general intent underlying 
a given constitutional provision or historical tradition, such inquiry should be neither 
confining nor superficial. For example, courts should focus upon the relevant 
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circumstances, context and expectations which lead to the historical evolution of “liberty” 
interests, to determine whether expansion of this interest warrants recognition of a newly-
asserted right.   
Of course, this proposition begs the question of whether and, if so, to what extent 
foreign sources of law should factor into the court’s analysis. As a preliminary matter, 
“negative” originalism would allow the use of foreign sources of law, but only to the 
extent that such sources are neither inconsistent with nor contrary to the domestic 
evolution of a particular constitutional value. In other words, foreign sources of law 
should not be used to justify a court’s subjective policy judgment, or unilateral desire to 
“draw American constitutional norms into ‘even closer union’ … with those of the rest of 
the world.”135 Foreign sources of law should not, therefore, be used to globalize the court 
at the expense of our unique domestic tradition; it should be used to confirm that an 
expansion of our domestic practice, to recognize a newly asserted right, is supported by a 
national evolution which renders incorporation with international consensus justified. 
Otherwise, the use of foreign materials will be susceptible to claims of arbitrariness, 
elitism and the desire by courts to substitute their policy predilections for those expressed 
through the democratic process. The use of foreign materials in such a manner could not 
be more pernicious, because it would undermine the values of our national 
constitutionalism, and slowly remove constitutional decision-making from the historical 
tradition upon which it rests.  
Of course, these sentiments only serve as a brief introduction to “negative” 
originalism, as its application will certainly engender practical difficulties. For example, 
it can be argued that ascertaining merely the general intent underlying historical 
 
135 Anderson, supra note 103. 
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conceptions of liberty will allow courts to utilize undefined platitudes, that are nowhere 
justified in domestic tradition, to unilaterally recognize new constitutional rights. The 
concept of “liberty”, for example, can mean whatever a court says it does, and can result 
in precisely the type of judicial policymaking that lies within the province of legislative 
action. In addition, with a modest amount of creative interpretation, courts will be able to 
selectively cite to domestic and foreign sources and justify whatever “rights expansion” it 
deems desirable. Similarly, while it may be possible to discern the general intent 
underlying specific constitutional provisions, such intent can never justify progressive 
jurisprudence that was never within the contemplations of the constitution’s drafters.  
These concerns are valid and merit significant debate. The problem, however, is 
that the same arguments can be advanced against Justice Scalia’s originalism, Justice 
Breyer’s progressivism, or any interpretive paradigm that vests judges with substantial 
discretion. “Negative” originalism constitutes an attempt to channel that discretion in 
such a manner that gives domestic practice primacy in constitutional decision-making, 
yet allows courts to recognize that history has limits concerning the objectives to which it 
strives and the situations to which it can be applied. The presence of a modern consensus 
that results from collective human experience does not mean that a progressive 
jurisprudence undermines domestic tradition. Moreover, by requiring courts to ensure 
that expansive rights-protection, based upon contemporary perspectives, does not 
undermine or offend our domestic tradition, “negative” originalism strives to ensure that 
courts exercise extreme care in recognizing newly asserted rights. Court must be sensitive 
to the historical record, and responsive to evolving notions of justice, if for no other 
reason than to provide meaningful contemporary understandings of the Constitution’s 
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most basic guarantees. Ultimately, courts should be circumspect to recognize “new” 
rights, and even more careful to place undue reliance upon foreign sources of law. If 
there exists uncertainty or conflict in domestic practice, then progressive change is best 
left to the democratic process. However, the “emerging awareness”136 reflected in 
“values” based adjudication warrants application of the principle that “history and 
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due 
process inquiry.”137 
136 Lawrence, supra note 3, at 11 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 
137 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at  857 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
